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STUDENT NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-APPARENT TRENDS
IN JURISDICTION
Previous notes in this series concerning the bases of jurisdic-
tion in cases involving conflict of laws have dealt with presence,1
appearance," doing business,- and the doing of an act. In addition
to a consideration of the general problems in each concept, an
effort has been made to determine whether each can be brought
within the physical power analysis of Justice Holmes? The con-
cepts of allegiance, domicile and consent remain to be considered
in the same manner and apparent trends in the field of jurisdiction
noted.
Allegiance. Probably the clearest instance of jurisdiction based
on allegiance is Blackmer v. United States? Blackmer, a citizen of
the United States resident in France, was personally served by the
American counsel With a subpoena to appear as a witness in a trial
in which the government was a party. Upon Blackmer's failure to
appear, a large amount of his property was seized by the govern-
ment by way of penalty for contempt. The United States Supreme
Court, in affirming the lower court, said that the ". . . United States
possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to
this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public
interest requires it . . M
Prior to this decision a series of cases involving the extra-terri-
torial operation of federal criminal and tax laws had been decided
on the basis of citizenship.' The jurisdictional power was said to
arise out of the ". . . relation as citizen to the United States and the
relation of the latter to him as citizen."'
It wculd appear that allegiance as a basis for jurisdiction is
proper only when the state in its sovereign capacity has an interest
in the suit. The statute under which Blackmer was subpoenaed was
so limited. Extraterritorial power is the exception rather than the
'Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 126.
ibid.
Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 182.
4 Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 316.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917).
284 U. S. 421 (1932).
Id. at 437.
'Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924); U. S. v. Bowman, 260 U. S.
94 (1922). For a later case see U. S. v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137 (1933);
cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941).
"Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 56 (1924).
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rule and it is believed that it should be relied upon only in extreme
cases. It is doubted, therefore, whether it should be used to secure
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit between individuals. While
there is at least one case between private parties in which jurisdic-
tion seems to have been based on allegiance,' it has not been gen-
erally followed and it may well be an improper application of the
theory.
Domicile. Another concept, one related to that of allegiance, by
which jurisdiction over an absent defendant can be secured is that
of domicile.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws" expresses the rule as to
domicile thus: "A state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts
over an individual domiciled within the state, although he is not
present within the state." This is subject, of course, to the usual
requirement that service be in a manner reasonably calculated to
give notice to the defendant of the suit.'
The rule has been justified as one of necessity for the reason
that otherwise an individual by absenting himself from the state
could avoid liability.' Some courts have refused to recognize this
doctrine," at least one declaring a statute so providing to be a
violation of the federal constitution.' On the other hand, the courts
Df a number of states have approved it."
The attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States remained
in doubt until 1940. McDonald v. Mabee' was an unsatisfactory
test in that the defendant had left the state which sought to exercise
jurisdiction for the purpose of establishing a domicile elsewhere
and for the additional reason that the method of service was not one
reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice.
In 1940, however, the court in Milliken v. Meyer' held that an
in personam judgment based on domicile and personal service out-
side the state was entitled to full faith and credit. In an opinion
" Ousley v. Leigh Valley Trust and Safe-Deposit Co., 84 Fed.
602 (E. D. Pa., 1897). It is believed that this case could and perhaps
should have been decided on domicile.
"RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) sec. 79.
2 Id. at see. 79, comment b.
"GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 158.
"De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345
(1896); McCormick v. Blaine, 345 Ill. 461, 178 N. E. 195 (1931);
Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494 (1911).
"Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494 (1911).
"Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 Atl. 715
(1929); In re Hendrickson, 40 S. D. 211, 167 N. W. 172 (1918). For
a case involving service where the defendant was concealing himself
within the state, see Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 161 N. W.
148 (1917).
"243 U. S. 90 (1917).
'0311 U. S. 457 (1940).
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which indicates tne anaiogy between allegiance and domicile the
court said:"
"As in the case of the authority of the United States over its
absent citizen (Blackmer v. U. S. . . .) the authority of a state
over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his
absence from the state. The state which accords him privileges
and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his
domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. . . . The responsibil-
ities of that citizen arise out of the relation to the state which
domicile creates. That relation is not dissolved by mere absence
from the state .... One such incident of domicile is amen-
ability to suit within the state during sojourn without the
state .... "
Rawstorne v. Maguire" illustrates a trend which is becoming
increasingly apparent. A New York statute provided for substituted
service upon a "natural person residing within the state". It was
contended that residence was used as a synonym for domicile but the
court rejected the contention saying that residence was less than
domicile and that bodily presence was sufficient to satisfy the mean-
ing of residence. That this is a new view there can be no doubt
for no longer ago than 1918, Professor Beale stated the rule to be
that a statute using the word residence, in order to be valid, must
be construed to mean domicile.'
Although, historically, domicile has been considered essential
in divorce actions, Williams v. North Caroline? approaches the resi-
dence test." If the Rawstorne and Williams cases mean that resi-
dence within the state, which amounts to little more than presence,
is sufficient ground upon which to found a judgment, the law is cer-
tainly entering a new stage. It is true that presence within the terri-
torial limits meets the physical power test and when it is coupled
with a method of service reasonably calculated to give notice, it may
well be that the defendant should not be allowed to defeat jurisdic-
tion simply by the defense that he was not personally served.
Consent. It is well established that parties cannot confer upon
a court jurisdiction over causes of action not within its power.2' It is
equally well recognized, however, that, broadly speaking, jurisdiction
over the parties may be conferred by their consent.
The entering of an appearance is frequently regarded as consent
to jurisdiction. This problem is discussed in a previous note in
which it is suggested that presence is a better rationalization.
Whether acceptance of service is in itself enough to constitute con-
Id. at 463, 464.
265 N. Y. 204, 192 N. E. 294 at 295.
- Beale, Residence and Domicile (1918) 4 IowA L. BULL. 3, 6.
317 U. S. 287 (1942).
"For this view see Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 123.
4 4
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) sec. 81, comment g.
Id. sec. 81.
"Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 126.
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sent is made a question of fact by the Restatement.' At first im-
pression it seems that it should be made a question of law rather
than of fact. But to say either that acceptance of service always
amounts to consent, or that it can never amount to consent, would
probably be less accurate than to say that whether or not it amounts
to consent depends upon the circumstances.
In addition to the procedural aspects of consent, consent may
arise out of an express agreement. Perhaps the most common
example of express consent is the confession of judgment provision
frequently contained in a promissory note. Although some states,
as a matter of policy, refuse to permit a confession of judgment,"
others hold that jurisdiction is thus conferred upon the court by the
consent of the parties" and the resulting judgment is entitled to full
faith and creditf' In such states a judgment can be rendered against
an absent defendant who is without notice3 ' or even against a defend-
ant who was in the jurisdiction and was not served.2 This is justi-
fied on the ground that the defendant voluntarily dispensed with
service, yet it is seriously doubted whether, as a matter of policy,
one should be allowed to contract away the requirement of reason-
able notice. Reasonable notice and opportunity to defend may well
be so basic in our law that a judgment without these requirements
should not be valid even though the parties have in fact consented.
The doing of business and the doing of an act are sometimes said
to imply consent to service but, as in the case of appearance, it is
believed that presence within the state is a more sound explanation
of jurisdiction in these cases.'
Agreements to submit future disputes to certain stated tribunals
present another type of consent. It is likely that agreements to refer
disputes to arbitrators will become more common, the problem pre-
sented being similar to the confession of judgment cases. In Gilbert
v. Burnstine" the New York court held a party bound by an award
made by an English Arbitration Board as a result of a clause in a
contract so providing. If the requirements of reasonable service are
met, it may well be that such agreements represent a sound develop-
ment in the law. It is significant that in the Gilbert case the New
York Chamber of Commerce presented briefs amicus curiae in sup-
port of the validity of the award. "'
I RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) sec. 81, comment c.
28KRS (1944) sec. 372.140.
"Egley v. Bennett, 196 Ind. 50, 145 N. E. 830 (1924); Morrison
v. First National Bank of Taos, 28 N. M. 129, 207 Pac. 62 (1922).
"Egley v. Bennett, 196 Ind. 50, 145 N. E. 830 (1924).
"Ibid.
' Morrison v. First National Bank of Taos, 23 N. M. 129, 207 Pac.
62 (1922).
" Note (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 316.
' 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931).
'Note (1931) 31 COL. L. R. 679.
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Summary.
To the bases of jurisdiction previously discussed we have now
added those of allegiance, domicile, and consent. Out of the allegi-
ance a citizen owes his sovereign arises the power of the state, when
its interests are involved, to extend the operation of its laws to absent
citizens. The analogous theory of domicile enables one of the states
of the United States to render judgments against a defendant who,
though absent, is actually domiciled within its borders. While some
courts use the fiction of implied consent to jurisdiction in cases
which can more accurately be based on presence, express consent
(by contract) may confer jurisdiction as in the confession of judg-
ment and arbitration cases. However, it seems that there is a strong
policy against jurisdiction in any case not based cn reasonable notice
and opportunity to defend.
Can the above bases of jurisdiction reasonably be brought
within the physical power analysis of Justice Holmes? If by phy-
sical power is meant only the actual power to seize and imprison the
defendant, obviously the analysis must fail. But physical power,
having existed at one time, may be said to continue although the
defendant has since left the state. Or it may exist in the sense of
power over the subject matter of the suit as in in rem proceedings
or in the sense of power over the situs of the transaction as in the
doing of an act cases. When considered in these various aspects
it is possible that physical power exists in all cases in which juris-
diction is properly exercised.
In the Blackmer case the court said that the United States had
power to require the return of a citizen but what the court actually
held was that the sovereign had the right to seize property within
its boundaries by way of penalty for failure to appear. An exami-
nation of the cases in which the allegiance basis of jurisdiction was
properly applied indicates that power existed over the person-as in
the criminal cases-or over his property-as in the Blackmer case.
The very essence of the domicile rule is physical power over
the defendant's domicile and once the concept of power over the
person of the defendant is abandoned, domicile presents no difficulty
so far as the Holmes' analysis is concerned.
When a defendant makes an appearance, he is actually within
the power of the court. When a foreign corporation does business
within the state or when an individual does an act within the state
out of which jurisdiction arises, the parties are present within
the state when the transaction occurs and the situs of the trans-
action remains within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The express consent cases present the greatest difficulty in
respect to the physical power concept. It is true that in both the
confession of judgment cases and the arbitration cases the subject
matter of the action (the note or the contract) is before the court
and the defendant can be said to have consented that jurisdiction
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over the subject matter will be sufficient. While the cases which
allow the defendant to contract away the requirement of notice
may be fundamentally wrong, it is also possible that the exigencies
of modern commercial transactions will lead to the gradual recog-
nition of the power to contract, that jurisdiction over the subject
matter, when accompanied by notice, is sufficient to support a
judgment.
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . .," said
Justice Holmes. It has been seen that, in its broad sense, physical
power can be said to exist in all cases in which jurisdiction is
properly exercised.
Apparent Trends in Jurisdiction
This is the final note in a series dealing with the problem of
jurisdiction in conflict of laws. After this somewhat detailed study,
at least three fairly well defined trends are apparent:
First, perhaps the most striking is the trend away from the
requirement of personal service within the territorial limits of
the court. This is undoubtedly the result of the greater mobility
of the nation's population in recent years. Without some relaxation
of the strict requirement of personal service, there would be many
situations in which it would be desirable to impose liability but in
which it could be avoided merely by making personal service within
the jurisdiction impossible, as in the absent motorist cases.
Second, the general move away from technical rules toward a
test of what is reasonable under the circumstances is reflected in
the tendency to hold that service is sufficient if it is reasonably
calculated to give notice of the suit and opportunity to defend. It
seems likely that the more practical tests of residence-or even
presence-will replace the technical rule of domicile.
Third, the recognition of the doctrine that jurisdiction can be
conferred upon a court by the express consent of the parties is a
reflection of the needs of present civilization and the desire to
encourage amicable settlements rather than to discourage them by
setting up technical requirements which are difficult to meet. Thus
even the basic concept of jurisdiction responds to changing condi-
tions and adapts itself to the needs of the times.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that a new test
is being developed for jurisdiction as it relates to conflict of laws.
While the courts still use the traditional bases, they have been
greatly extended and the probability of further extension is already
apparent. It therefore seems possible that in the future a court
will be said to have jurisdiction to render a personal judgment if
the parties and/or the subject matter are before the court, and if
the defendant has been served in a manner reasonably calculated
to give him notice and if he has a reasonable opportunity to defend.
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